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I have; life size m:lp of the world, but I don'r know where ro pur it. 
- Comedian Steven Wright 
The world is its own best model. 

- Rodney Brooks. lmtllif.m« without &pmmuzrion 

The humor of comedian Steven Wright is thar in one sen­
renee he captures the irony ofeveryday life. 
lr is funny because there is truth in it, and l cannot help bur 
link Wright's irony wirh our current technological models. Jn 
suggesting "the world is its own best model," Rodney Brooks 
is working against the technological model ofcreating virruaJ 
maps of the world by suggesting an alternate view char intel­
ligence is situated and embodied, a "dynamics of the interac­
tion with the world."1 Developed through his mobile robots 
at MIT's AJ Lab, Brooks shifrs technological anention from 
mechanism ro behavioral imeracrion. Brooks questions me 
very foundations of technological thinking in representation­
al models or so-calJed experr systems, suggesting me thinking 
hasn'r changed. only the technology has advanced, giving the 
impression that one's thinking is evolving. Questioning the 
foundations of technology is what this paper is abour. My 
interest here is nor robors, nor necessarily technology, bur 
means ro increase interaction berween agenrs, artifacts and 
the environment as the foundaLion of human experience. As 
will be developed, the philosopher Henri Bergson suggests 
that the aspect of manufacturing artificial objecrs, particu­
larly tools to make rools, and indefinitely varying their manu­
facrure is SO central tO human intelligence mar he proposes to 
replace the designation of our species from Homo sapim.s to 
Homofob~r.~ 
The outcomes of a second-year srudio presented lasr year 
concluded thar technique is nor simply the applicacion of 
skills, but involves intention, criticality and improvisation 
where technique is nor a function of thinking then making, 
but thinking through making. J This research paper contin­
ues from these statements finding overwhelming supporr for 
thinking through making from other fields of inquiry from 
philsophy, sociology, neurobiology, and embodied cogni-
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don. What is unique abour rhe relarion berween these differ­
em fields and their tic to archicecrural pedagogy is chat they 
exemplify one simple point: action pr~ud(s cognition. In many 
ways it seems that Thave simply found support for what I 
have intuitiv~ly felr all along, only now, linking it to ~liet 
knowledge from other fields is doing precisely what chis paper 
is abouc-making th( implicit ~licit. Making me implicit 
expHcic suggests char design is a mode of research at d1e poinr 
that we are able to connecr what we do with larger socio­
culru.ral experiences and issues. While technique is certainly 
bound in process or action, technique as methqd intends ro rie 
tacit and implicit actions with propositional objectives. 
Architectural Context 
As technology has become ubiquirous in architectural practice 
and most sd1ools, and furthermore, as digitally-driven fabri­
cation technology has forged connections bcrween the digital 
and material, there has been a grear deal of talk about tech­
nique in theoretical discourse and ics relationship ro design 
research, perhaps best UJustrated by Foreign Office Architects 
Phylogmesis. Michael Speaks has challenged the higher status 
of theory calling for a focus on innovarion rbrough "design 
inrelligencc" in which "practices are the techniques, relation­
ships, inreUigence, and disposition that shape design" as these 
very practices encourage risk raking as opposed ro problem 
solving. • James Comer adds a delightful proviso ro Speaks' 
"design incciJigence" where material techniques are the mare­
rial matrix from which strategic techniques play ouc.s A gen­
eral conclusion could be dravm char material technique is rhe 
foundation for strategic techniques, bur material techniques 
only become innovative at the point they tic into strategic 
techniques. Similady, Michel de Cerceau in Th~ Practice of 
Ev"}day Lift discioguishes between rwo "logics of action" 
of strategy and tactics. Similar to material techniques, tac­
tics form the bedrock ofstrategic actions in which "tactics in 
general form a field qfoperatiqns within which the prqduction 
oftheory also rakes plau."6 Cerceau's central concern is on the 
relationship berween discourse and action in which the over­
emphasis on scientific method has "progressively overturned 
the relationship between knowing and doing" in which dis­
course legislates action? 
Inverting Method 
In me chapter cnrided "Theory in Relation to Method," in 
ArchitecturalRese.arch Methqtfs, Linda Groat and David Wang 
suggest that research methods are "a way co verifY or cesc the­
ories."8 Furthermore, these theories are drawn from a larger 
pool of philosophy. The diagram they draw is so familiar in 
terms of scientific method, it likely isn't questioned (figure 
1). Bur is chis design? Certainly chis .is the cemral concern of 
their exrensivc work, and this is not intended as a critique. As 
evidenced here, I am influenced by philosophy and theory, 
but I do nor suggest that practice proves theories derived 
from philosophy. bur rather, effective theories are developed 
through experience. As a result, I ask a simple question: what 
ifwe invert their diagram (figure 2)? What ifwe begin wirh 
tactics, generalize to strategy and develop rheory from there 
as it seems de Cerreau would suggest? Technique as method 
may be a more fining research strategy for the design stu­
dio, particularly as the design process is not prescriptive, but 
one of problem discovery. Rather than fitting design research 
inro a restricted mode of scicnrific research, this paper fol­
lows Ranulpb GlanvUJe chat design is a mode of research.9 
Glanville argues for an increase in know-bow, as opposed ro 
know-what, and in a recent conversation has suggested a fur­
ther development from know-how to know-for, or knowl­
edge-for-action. However, where cechnology is concerned, il 
seems know-how is quickly turned inro know-how-co-do, or 
a series of procedural steps without any connection co larger 
objecrives. Ir is also dear that technique, or practical knowl­
edge, without larger propositional objectives, folds back on 
icself, becoming a self-proscribed circle in which the work 
is abour technique which only follo-.vs from the technology 
being employed. Yec, chis weakness also provides a proscrip­
tive criterion to rest the validity of red1nique as method: char 
technique doc.~ not become a description of rhc procedural 
seeps taken. Rather, rhe subtle shift from know-how co know­
for is congruem with technique as method-linking know­
bow, or technique, with know-for, or method. So whar might 
that link be? I suggest that it simply may be feedback, which 
stems from the cybernetic perspecrive from which Glanville 
writes, which consequencly originates from me very techno­
logical developmenr which we now take w be ubiquitous. 
Cybernetic Perspective o.n Meth.od 
Cybernetics is nor a unified field or djscipline, bur represencs 
a consortium of philosophers, marhemaricians, biologists, 
psychologists, cognitive scientists and sociologiscs, which 
are generally bound in an epistemological shift moving from 
ideal static rypes or stares with origins in Platonic chougbc, to 
active processes relating imcrnal and external systems. I do nor 
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wish ro follow cybernetics roo closely, as its theories arc as 
nuanced as its authors; however, there are a few general prin­
ciples that affect the relationship berween method, technol­
ogy and human understanding. 
Norbert Weiner is often cited as the founder of the term 
cybernetics through his book Cyb~metics: or th~ Control and 
Communication in the Animal and the Machine. 10 One of 
Weiner's principle comriburions is the idea of negative feed­
back shifting from pre-programmed medunisms ro creating 
feedback loops correcting the difference between the desired 
goal and the acrual condition. Said another way, the shift 
in technology is nor in the mechanism itself, bur the means 
ro relate the mechanism with the world: technology becom~s 
about the communication ofinformation in time. 
An interesting application of cybernetic thinking in com­
purer graphics is the program Logo developed by Seymour 
Papert (which I was quite good at in elementary school). Pap­
err follows closely from Weiner's trajectory and sums it up 
in a simple phrase: making best use of limited knowledge. 11 
UnJike Weiner's technological focus, Papert's mentor was psy­
chologist Jean Piager, and consequently, Papen's focus was 
on human behavior, and education in pankular, enabled 
by technology. Papen, following Piager, proposes char co 
understand is ro invent: when techoology enables invention, 
or innovation, it becomes tied to human cognition. Paperr 
suggests that this cybernetic view is not simply mechanically 
different, bm is episrcmologically different, or whar Weiner 
described as the rurn fi-om a Newtonian or mechanical view 
of the world, to a process or time-based view of the world, 
which he terms Bergsooian Time. 
Bc.rgsonian Time and Intuition 
The phiJosopher Henri Bergson wrote Creative Evolution 
about 50 years before the first conferences on cybernet­
ics were held, and yer the epistemological shift he sought is 
largely congruenr with the cybernetic epistemology. Duration 
is the central theme of rime in Bergson's work, which is con­
cerned with active processes. This is not process in general, 
as in "the design process," but rather those specific moments, 
those intervals in which improvisation occurs. Thinking, for 
Bergson, is thinking through marrer, in which duration can­
not disassociate the "theory of knowledge" (general concepts) 
from the "theory oflife~ (action). Durarion is a circular pro­
cess between action and representation thar "push each other 
on unceasingly" reciprocating berween instinct and imelJect 
in which our actions t/Q not play out our thoughrs any more than 
our thoughts cvolvt from our actions. Duration then supports 
the inversion of scientific method, not as opposed to ir, bur 
as ru1other way ofworking through process. 
Furthermore, this Bergsonian view ties technique to method 
through intuition. Intuition, like improvisation, is a word 
rhar is frequendy used in design education and for good rea­
son; intuition seems to be many things ro many people but 
most of all is casually used as synonymous with instinct. For 
Bergson, intuirion is distincr from instinct, and this distinc­
tion is the inspiration for technique as method. Intuition is 
central ro Bergson's method as the go-berween of instinct and 
inrellecr: "by intuition I mean inscincr rhar has become disin­
terested, self-conscious, capable of reSecting upon its object 
and of enJarging it indefinicely."'2 And willie ir would seem 
this inruition leans roward instinct, Bergson also continues, 
"without inrelHgence, it would have remained in the form of 
insrincr, riveted ro the special objecr of its practical inreresr." 
In this way, instinct pulls inruition ro maredal action, and 
yet, the intellect pulls inruirion coward a conscious reSection 
of its actions. Ifinruition is thought to be instinct, ir conceals 
the very reciprocal process by which material practices lead co 
propositional knowledge. It is the leaning ofinruition toward 
inrellecr as a conscious reflection ofaction char method can give 
validity ro rechnique-.shifi-ing technique from simply being 
insrincrual habit by tying it to a larger picrure. 
Action and Cognition 
Returning ro the cybernetic view, and moving from Weiner's 
mathematical inlluencc to Paperr's pscyhological influence, 
a rransicion to learning through technique can be made 
through Humberto Marurana and Francisco Varela's biologi­
cally-inspired approach to cybernetics, whose work ar times 
seems like a seamless devdopmenr of Bergson's Cr~ative 
Evolution. Varela and Maturana follow from Bergson's reci­
procity berween action and knowledge quite explicitly: ''All 
knowing is doing; all doing is knowing.'' 13 Wha.r they caiJ 
"walking on the razor's edge" is closely linked ro my motiva­
tions here, in which they wish ro "walk" berween the abso­
lu.re objectivity of a knowable world and the roral arbitrari­
ness or relativism of anything possible.14 Like Bergson, their 
concern over representational models is that they blind the 
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possibilicy of moment-co-moment behavior of organic sys­
tems, which conceals rhe actualicy of social inreracrion, rhe 
potencial of unforeseen actions or improvisation, and how 
me environment influences actions. Through their biologi­
cal background, they show convincingly char action is ried 
to cognition through sensori-motor coupling. Disdnguishing 
between the automatic actions of the most basic single-celled 
organism in which the sensory surface and rhe motor sur­
face are one and the same, and complex organisms which link 
separate sensory and motor surfaces processed through neu­
ronal networks and transmitted through the nervous system, 
they show chat the very sear of hwnan consciousness is based 
on an internal reciprocicy between sensory and motor activ­
icy (imernal sysrem) and rbe reciprocicy between this internal 
system and the environmenr (ex:rernal sysrcm). 15 
This may seem obscure until we compare ic co certain prepos­
terous sracements like "I chink, therefore I am."16 Ir also sug­
gests char when a student says they have ic all "worked out in 
their head," and now just need to do it, they have nothing bur 
a trace of an idea, bur who could know if it's sruck "in their 
head." Or worse, a srudem cannot sir idle "waiting for an 
idea." ideas are nor simply found as much as they are actively 
developed and uncovered; idtaS art! rt!lmions. 
Most significandy, Marurana and Varela show that our mosr 
basic actions, even walking, are learned from a social and 
environmental conrcxrand arc not biologically inevitable. We 
do not simply "cake in~ information &om the environmem, 
bur actively e>..-plore it rbrough "structural coupling." This is 
fundamental to learning, as knowledge is not received, but 
develops through observing change in behavior between an 
organism and irs environment in a realm or domain defined 
by a question, either implicit or cxplicir.'7 Therefore technique 
offers a means ofinvoking change, ofactively exploring one's 
actions and rheir effects on an environment, bur can only 
become knowledge at che point that a question is involved, 
coupling merhod, or objective, to technique, or action. 
Technique is not Magic 
Technique is thought co be trick--y, sliglll of hand, in fact Lied 
to "magic" through myrhology. 18 lnsread ofsuggesting a mag­
ical component of technique, de Cerreau reminds rhac our 
practical actions are connected to narration, which is distinct 
&om dcscriprion.19 Making rbe implicit explicit may reveal 
rhar our techniques are not based on anything bur the tech­
nology we are using, which suggests we have only gathered 
me techniques required, bur have nor yet set our to innovate 
from chis foundation. Alternarivdy, when we are able co tie 
material technique to larger socio-culrural issues, I chink we 
will find we are no longer talking about technology. It is only 
when we are able to structurally couple our techniques with 
Larger socio-cultural issues chat technique can tie to innova­
tion and working through collaboration. Perhaps chis prag­
matic tendency can best by summariud by John Dewey: 
"Practical skill, modes of effective technique, can be inrd­
ligencly, non-mechanically used, only when inrclligencc has 
played a pan in their acquisirion."20 
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